The EU wants to end national vetoes as frustration grows over repeated decision-making deadlocks in areas that increasingly define the bloc’s global role. From sanctions on Russia to enlargement talks with Ukraine and the Western Balkans, unanimity requirements have slowed or diluted collective action, prompting senior EU officials to question whether the system remains viable.
Under current rules, every member state must agree on decisions in sensitive fields such as foreign policy, taxation, defence cooperation, and EU enlargement. Supporters of reform argue that this structure leaves the bloc vulnerable to obstruction by a single government, regardless of how strong the majority consensus may be. This is the central reason the EU wants to end national vetoes, particularly in external relations where speed and credibility matter.
The preferred alternative is qualified majority voting (QMV), which allows decisions to pass if backed by a majority of member states representing a majority of the EU population. Advocates say QMV would make the EU more responsive to crises and reduce the leverage of tactical vetoes. Yet resistance remains widespread. Smaller states fear marginalisation, while others worry that larger economies could override national priorities.
The political reality explains why the EU wants to end national vetoes without rewriting the EU’s founding treaties. Treaty change would require unanimous approval and, in some countries, national referendums — a process fraught with political risk. Instead, attention has turned to existing treaty tools, particularly the “passerelle clause,” which allows governments to agree unanimously to switch from unanimity to QMV in specific policy areas. The irony is unavoidable: removing vetoes still depends on unanimous consent.
Countries that rely heavily on veto power are reluctant to give it up. Hungary’s repeated use of unanimity rules to block sanctions and funding decisions has made it a focal point of the debate, but other governments privately value the bargaining leverage vetoes provide. This dynamic helps explain why the EU wants to end national vetoes gradually rather than through sweeping reform.
There are also broader political risks. Ending vetoes could fuel domestic backlash in states where EU authority is already contested. Some leaders argue that slower, consensus-based decision-making offers protection against policy mistakes, especially in foreign affairs, where missteps can have lasting consequences.
One potential compromise lies in hybrid models. Instead of abolishing vetoes outright, the EU could introduce conditional opt-outs or time-limited unanimity, after which QMV would automatically apply. Another option would be to tie veto use to political or financial costs, discouraging obstruction without eliminating sovereignty. (Speculation: these approaches may gain traction as enlargement makes unanimity harder to sustain.)
Ultimately, the EU wants to end national vetoes because the bloc’s future size and ambitions make the current system increasingly fragile. Whether reform can proceed without deepening divisions will shape the next chapter of European integration.
